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The Fiscal Costs of Local Economic Growth
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Director:

Thomas Power

A median voter model is used to test the hypothesis that changes
In the level of employment in a political jurisdiction--in this
case, Montana counties--will positively affect the quantity of
public goods demanded by the decisive voter in that jurisdiction.
The theoretical and empirical development of the median voter
model is traced over its half-century life and the theory's
assumptions are made explicit.
In order to test the maintained hypothesis, a "demand function"
for the median (decisive) voter was formulated with county
expenditures acting as proxy for the quantity demanded.
This
quantity was posited as a function of several variables. Including
the employment change variables needed to test the maintained
hypothesis, demographic variables, and the more "traditional"
demand function variables median income and tax price.
A number
of other "price" variables were included in the model in order to
more accurately capture the true marginal cost of public goods.
The costs of such goods are borne both by members of the
community, who can vote for those who levy taxes to finance public
goods, and by nonresidents, who can not vote and, presumably, have
little say In determining their tax bills.
Of particular
Importance were variables Intended to reflect the cost of public
goods paid by someone other than the median v o t e r .
No empirical evidence was found to support the hypothesized
relationship between the quantity of public goods demanded and
changes In the community's employment level.
However, the results
of the model Indicated that the median voter formulation most
often used in other studies of public expenditures is incomplete
and should be augmented with the additional "price" variables (or
Improved versions of those variables) Introduced in this study.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to test the maintained hypothesis,
which is, briefly stated,
employment in a

that a change in the type and level of

political jurisdiction will positively affect that

jurisdiction's level of public expenditures.
reasons to believe this to be true.

There are a number of

The primary reason is that economic

activity, measured by employment growth, necessitates greater public
spending.

As business activity increases, one would expect growing

political pressures placed on local government to expand spending on
business- and residential-related services.
A number of economists and other social scientists have attempted
to measure the marginal costs to the public sector of growth in
employment.

Such studies have most often utilized the statistical tool

of multiple regression.

The authors of these studies have all

recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that in order to properly
test the role of employment growth in the determination of public
expenditures, a model of public expenditure determination must exist.
In other words, employment growth is not the only determinant of the
level of public expenditures, and measures of that growth must not be
the only independent variables in such a regression model. Thus, a
necessary first step in testing the relationship between employment
growth and public spending is the construction of a model of public
expenditures which both "explains" the variation in public expenditures
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In a statistical sense and provides a reasonable behavioral explanation
for their variation.

Such a model would, if itself adequate to

"explain" a sufficient portion of this variation, provide a context for
testing any additional effects employment changes might have on
expenditures.
Testing of the employment-spending relationship has been the
primary purpose of this study. However,

it soon became apparent that the

construction of the behavioral and statistical models with which to test
this relationship was the more challenging and theoretically interesting
portion of the project.

Thus, the bulk of this paper, and the most

theoretically significant conclusions reached, concern the continuing
developments of appropriate theories and techniques for the modeling of
public expenditures; the role of employment in determining such
expenditures seems of secondary importance.
Chapter Two outlines the major features of the behavioral model
chosen as a context for testing the maintained hypothesis, the median
voter model.

Researchers had examined the determinants of public

expenditures long before the theoretical outlines of this model were
delineated.

However, models constructed without the aid of the median

voter model (or any other broad theoretical construct) were
statistically inferior to those constructed according to the median
voter theory.
With such results in mind, and with the firm conviction that
statistical testing should not be done without reference to a guiding
theory, this researcher chose to test the maintained hypothesis in the
context of the median voter model.

This decision does not reflect
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acceptance of the median voter model as a "true" representation of the
process that determines the level of public spending;

it merely results

from a recognition that median voter models have been among the most
successful of public expenditure models (as judged by statistical
criteria).
Chapter Three outlines the evolution of public expenditure analysis
and demonstrates some of the reasoning used, tested, and abandoned by
past researchers.

Chapter Four outlines the functional form and the

independent and dependent variables used in the regression equations.
Chapter Five gives the results of those regressions.

Chapter Six

contains a discussion of theoretical implications of the regressions and
the conclusions reached.
A more complete and accurate model of public expenditures is
important.

This papers seeks to improve upon existing public

expenditure models.

An improved model could be of great practical

Importance as well as theoretical interest.

Taxpayers, for

instance,

will want to know whether and to what extent their tax bills will be
affected by employment growth.

The regressions presented here will not

address such a question directly, but they will lead toward greater
understanding of the process which determines both taxing and spending.
Government planners will want to have a better model for predicting
expenditure levels.

These regressions should be of direct application

to such

The planners will want to know, in effect, whether

questions.

employment growth will pay for itself by expanding the local tax base
enough to cover expenditure growth.

Because multiple regression models

effectively hold all other variables in the equation constant while
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estimating the coefficients for each variable, these regressions will
address the planners' questions about both taxing and spending.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL

In recent years, economists have modeled political behavior 'as If'
it were driven by the same narrow self interests used in the purely
economic

models of producer and consumer behavior.

they began to

In other words,

develop an economic, as opposed to a political, theory of

collective decision making which has come to be known as public choice.

THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE

The theory of public choice attempts to explain the outcomes of
collective decision making by modeling society as if it were composed of
rational,

self-interested voters and politicians.

Although government

taxing and spending decisions are essentially political decisions made
through a group process, public choice theory attempts to analyze such
policies through an examination of the motivations of the individuals
which make up that group, rather than an exploration of the dynamics of
the collective.
Voters and politicians,
respectively,

it is assumed, attempt to maximize,

their utility and votes, just as consumers and producers

in the private
With this model,

marketplace attempt to maximize utility and profits.
economists have attempted to explain how voters

actually "choose" the basket of public goods and services they receive
from government.

Economists using

this model have met with limited but

significant success in attempting to explain,

in both theoretical and
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statistical senses, the variations in public expenditures across
political jurisdictions.

POLITICIANS, VOTERS, AND THE MEDIAN VOTER

The model assumes that the politician, qua politician, sees his or
her personal welfare as linked with holding office and thus seeks to
maximize the votes he or she receives by adopting policies and positions
which will appeal to as many voters as possible.

The politician is

thought to accomplish this by appealing to the so-called "median
voter.
In order to model the outcome of political processes, public choice
theorists assume that collective decisions will be determined by the
outcome of a vote, with the preference of the majority,
percent of the

electorate plus one, prevailing.

voters are aware of the
for which they pay.

i.e. fifty

It is assumed that

tax schedule and the public goods and services

It is also assumed that voters 'sincerely'

(i.e.

^Howard R.Bowen, "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of
Economic Resources," Quarterly Journal of Economics 53 (February 1943); 27-48.
In this ground-breaking theoretical work, Bowen referred to the "modal" rather
than the "median" voter.
However, he had assumed a normal distribution of
voter preferences, so the two were identical.
Many public finance texts
contain detailed and somewhat more tractable discussions of what is today
called the median voter.
For instance, see the public choice chapters in
Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) and Buchanan and Flowers (1980).
All voters are
assumed to be both consumers of public goods, to some extent, and taxpayers
who will pay a share of the cost of producing and providing the goods.
The
rational voter will, in determining his or her own preference for public goods
and services, weigh personal costs and benefits (at the margin).
The model
does not assume that voters will support policies which are efficient from a
social point of view, only that they will support policies which will produce
net benefits for them personally.
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truthfully) express their public goods preferences in

elections that

and those preferences can be ordered on a continuum of low to high
demands for public goods.
'single

The preferences of voters are said to be

peaked," i.e. they are ordered in a transitory manner.

these conditions,

Under

the preference of the voter "in the middle"--the

median voter--will prevail.^

Even in the unlikely event that the vote

is as evenly split as possible, with just under half of the electorate
voting one way and just over half voting the other, the median voter is
assured of being on the winning side.

In such an electoral outcome, the

votes of all other electors offset one another and the median voter's
vote determines the outcome.

Of course, the median voter will clearly

be in the winning camp if the vote is less evenly divided.
Thus, the voter who occupies the political median. the middle
ground of

the political spectrum, determines the outcome of elections.^

Public choice theorists go a step further, however,
identify this powerful elector.
political median also occupies

in an attempt to

They assume that the person at the
the economic median.^

This further

^Robert P. Inman, "Testing Political Economy's 'As If' Proposition: Is
the Median Income Voter Really Decisive?" Social Science Quarterly 33 (1978):
45.
^Randall G. Holcombe, "Concepts of Public Sector Equilibrium,"
National
Tax Journal 43 (March 1980): 79. While the outcomes of elections can not be
claimed to be economically efficient, they do represent points of agreement
among the electorate and can thus be called points of "equilibrium."
''Ibid. , p.p. 45-65.
Inman's intent in this study was to test the
validity of the median voter hypothesis.
He tested the hypothesis by
regressing the log of school expenditures per pupil on four alternative sets
of independent variables using both ordinary least squares and two-stage least
squares.
In all formulations the coefficients on the median tax share and
median income variables were statistically significant, relatively stable, and
of the theoretically correct sign.
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assumption allows the median voter to be Identified as the owner of the
median-valued residential property In the jurisdiction and also the
earner of the median income.
greatly simplifies,

In this way the public choice theorist

and probably over-simplifies,

political preferences.

the "distribution" of

According to this model, political preferences

precisely parallel economic interests.

Such a model of voter

behavior

seems justified when the issues to be decided are purely or mostly
financial; w hen voters have a choice of more or less spending on some
governmentally provided good or service they can be expected to decide
largely on the basis of self interest and their own financial
ca p a bilities.5

Many

social scientists have modeled school levy

elections in this way and they seem to have met with considerable
success.

It is apparently not unreasonable to assume that the voter has

a reasonably good idea of what passage of the levy

will cost him or her

p e rsonally and an estimate of his or her personal benefit from the good
or service.

Inman concluded that "using the median income voter appears to be a
reasonable first-order approximation to the process of local government
politics in this sample of single service g overnments." (emphasis added)
However, he also urged the inclusion of political variables in expenditure
equations, noting
chat the cost of such inclusion was low and the information gains significant
^Edgar K. Browning and Jacqueline M. Browning, Public Finance and the
Price System 2nd edition (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1983) p.
56.
While all voters make these calculations, or at least act as if they made
them, only the preferences of the median voter are realized through the
electoral process.
Thus, neither society as a whole nor the majority of
voters get what they want.
Under the best of circumstances, only the median
voter achieves an outcome that equates the marginal costs with the marginal
benefits of the provision and consumption of public goods.
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THE DEMAND FO R PUBLIC GOODS

One of the potentially more important applications of the theory of
the med ian voter has been in the estimation of local public
expenditures.®

Some

economists feel that, with several assumptions,

they can measure public goods

and services in terms of expenditures and

can statistically estimate a demand

function for them.^

The assumption

that the unit cost of public goods is constant with changing output
makes expenditures proportional to the quantity of goods and services
provided regardless of the quantity supplied,
proxy for quantity in statistical

and thus suitable as a

(regression) models.

A

further

assumption that unit costs are constant across political jurisdictions
allows for cross-sectional analysis of expenditures.
In such models,
a function of prices,

the voters'
incomes,

expenditure preferences are posited as

and tastes and preferences,

commonly done for the demand for private goods.

just as is

The demand function is

writ t e n

G - f(t,y,x)

where G is the individual's expenditure preference,

t is his or her

"tax price," y is the individual's income, and x is a vector of the

®Dennis C. Mueller,
1979) p.

Public Choice

(New York;

Cambridge University Press

106.

^Robert T. Deacon, "Private Choice and Collective Outcomes:
Evidence From Public Sector Demand Analysis," National Tax Journal 40
(December 1977): 374
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voter's tastes and preferences.

Two of these variables,

the vector of tastes and preferences,

tax price and

may be a bit unfamiliar and

require explanation.
The tax price,
her

t.

is the "price" faced by the individual for his or

consumption of public goods and services.

assumed to be

constant,

tax price

Since unit costs are

is proportional to the amount the tax

bill changes with a marginal change in expenditures.

In a political

system in which all goods and services are paid for with property tax
revenues,

tax price can be modeled as proportional to the ratio of the

value of the voter's property to that of the jurisdiction's entire
property tax base.
Of course,

local governments almost always finance goods and

services with additional sources of funds, and if any of these other
sources of funds are taxes other than property taxes they

should be

represented in the demand function through additional tax price
variables.

For instance, where the local government is partially

financed through a sales tax, an additional tax variable should reflect
this.

This additional variable is required to account for the full

effect of the expenditure-related costs on the voter.
Beck,

For instance,

John

in his study of the public expenditures of California

municipalities,

felt the need to incorporate a sales tax variable in his

d emand function since these municipalities derived a substantial
proportion of their tax revenue from a state-wide sales tax.®

His

®John H. Beck, "Nonmonotonic Demand for Municipal Services:
Var i a t i o n Among Communities," National Tax Journal 48 (March, 1984):
61.
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formulation thus Included both property tax and sales tax v a r i a b l e s .
Beck felt the property tax variable represented the voter's marginal
price while the sales tax variable, which represented a tax whose rate
was constant for all voters,

could not be thought of as a price per s e .

It should be noted that Beck's tax variables were specified as mean,
rather than median values;

the marginal tax price was specified as tax

base per capita and the sales tax variable was revenue per capita.
income variable,

however,

The

was specified as median family income in the

jurisdiction.
The variable for income,
income variable serves
services;
question.

it

y , serves precisely the same purpose the

in demand functions for private goods and

indicates the consumer's ability to pay for the item in

Again,

this demand function models the behavior of the median

voter and the median voter is assumed to have the median income in the
jurisdiction.

Consequently,

economists in recent years have used

either med ian family or median household income in such models.

Family

income appears to be used most often, but a case can be made for use of
hou s e h o l d income when the tax-supported expenditures of the governments
under study are paid for exclusively or primarily with property taxes.
The vector of tastes and preferences,

x. represents a number of

characteristics that describe the voter and thus indicate what sort of
goods and services he or she is likely to desire,

and in what quantity

A n u m b e r of variables have been used in such demand analysis studies.
They are chosen to fit the level of government and type of expenditures
studied.
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CRITICISMS OF THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL

It should be noted that not all economists feel the median voter
"theorem" has been adequately tested.
Rosenthal,

in a 1979 article,

application of the theorem.

Thomas Romer and Howard

pointed out methodological errors in the
They

complained that this formulation was

far too infrequently compared to alternative formulations which account
for political institutions,
statistical alternatives,

such as control of agendas,

or simple

such as mean income and tax prices rather than

median.^
These authors also point to two logical fallacies that challenge
the

primacy of the median voter's preferences in determining the

outcome of

elections.

The first is the "multiple fallacy," by which

Romer and Rosenthal argue that the ordinary least squares models that
are often used to test the

median voter formulation are not sensitive

to the absolute amount of spending preferred by the median voter;

they

m a y provide a perfectly acceptable statistical "fit" to the data even
though the median voter actually prefers
spending level.

some multiple of the observed

The second logical fallacy,

"the fractile fallacy,"

arises because any fractile of income and tax price would do as well as
median values in certain formulations of the model.
Finally,

there are several studies in which median tax price

appears to be statistically significant but median income does not,
vice versa.

or

Such results simply defy usual economic expectations and

^Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, "The Elusive Median Voter,"
Journal of Public Economics 12 (1979): 143-70.
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suggest that the logical and statistical explanation of public
expenditures requires a model much more complex than a simple demand
function.
Also, while some researchers have affirmed the validity of the
median

voter model,

such as Robert

they have qualified their findings.

Economists

Inman have endorsed the median voter formulation for the

study of single service governments such as school districts, but have
stopped short of recommending the model for the study of multiple
service providers,

such as municipal and county governments.

Pommerehne has found that this model works best for

Werner

'explaining'

the

level of public expenditures in direct democracies with ref e r e n d a .
Confirmation of the usefulness of the model

under such carefully

delineated circumstances says little or nothing of its usefulness in the
study of expenditures determined by representative bodies.
However,

other researchers have gone further (perhaps too far) and

assumed that the voter has sufficient information about candidates to
kn o w whet h e r they favor more or less spending on a particular good or
service and h o w much.

The voter,

in effect, makes a decision not only

on the candidate but also on the budget.

The assumption that a voter

can assess his or her marginal costs and benefits of a public good or
service w h e n the price
thing.

is virtually spelled out for him or her is one

An assumption that the voter can somehow glean comparable

’■^Werner W. Pommerehne, "Institutional Approaches to Public
E x p e n d i t u r e ,"
Journal of Public Economics 9 (April, 1978) 255-280.
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infoinnation from a candidate's campaign and his party's platform is
quite another.
This

latter assumption is far less compelling than the first.

Campaign promises and platforms are, by nature, vague sorts of things
and often are not adhered to anyway.

Also,

the voter can never really

know beforehand what issues will be coming before the elected official.
Under such circumstances,

the voting decision can never be made on

completely rational grounds.

The voter must often choose the candidate

whose preferences he believes to conform most closely to his own.
Furthermore,

a politician represents not a single public good or

service but a large and varied package of goods and services.

The

difficulty faced by the voter of assessing the costs and benefits of a
single public good is multiplied by the number of goods and services
w hich the elected official is expected to decide upon once in office.
Finally, not all decisions faced by public officials are of the
"more or less" variety.

The task of choosing whether more or less tax

m o n e y is to be spent on public roads or education,
be, pales

complicated as it may

in comparison with the task of choosing a member of a

legislative body who will decide that one type of behavior is criminal
and another type is not.

The first type of decision

the basis of anticipated costs and benefits.
decision,

can be decided on

In the second type of

personal costs and benefits become nearly impossible to

calculate and are often secondary to a voter's ideological preferences.
Thus the median voter model seems appropriate in cases

in which the

v o t e r will decide on levels of public taxing and spending directly.
model seems entirely inappropriate for the modeling of elections for
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officials who will

spend public monies on a broad variety of public

services and also decide
criminal law.

Issues of a more Ideological nature,

such as

It also seems Inappropriate for the modeling of elections

of candidates who will decide on a large number of unknown Issues.
Dennis Mueller has noted that many.

If not most,

empirical tests

of the median voter model use expenditure data on local government
expenditures determined typically by representative governments voting
on several Issues simultaneously.
voter formulation has
of a single

Mueller points out that the median

yielded quite satisfactory results In the context

Issue vote In a direct democracy.

conducting such studies have,

However,

the researchers

either explicitly or Implicitly,

assumed

away the theoretical points discussed above and have treated local
public expenditures as If they contained only one characteristic and
were decided separately.

A further common assumption Is

campaign positions of candidates can be taken as honest
of what they will do once In o f f i c e . M u e l l e r

offers no

that the
representations
rationale

that would justify such a set of assumptions; he only makes them
explicit.
A further complication results from the fact that most local
governments

engage,

to some degree.

In general fund budgeting.

Because

tax monies are pooled In a common fund used to finance several public
goods and services,

the taxpayer's perception of the potential costs and

benefits of public goods Is blurred.

Voters,

in Mueller's words,

can

^^Mueller, p. 106. Mueller's book Is Intended as a survey of the
more significant work in the field of public choice up to the time of
Its writing.
He attempts to explain, but not justify, the work with
w h i c h he Is familiar.
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suffer from what may be called "fiscal I l l u s i o n . A g a i n .

Mueller

offers little hope of escape from these dilemmas.
The complications resulting from general fund budgeting carried out
by elected representatives rather than voters themselves comprise
significant differences between the median voter model as originally
conceived by Bowen and the models used in much empirical testing of the
median voter theorem.

Such complications mav very well result in a

"representative" committee elected on the basis of "fiscal Illusion"-one that may be tempted and able to engage
strategic behavior.

However,

some times and places,

in log rolling and other

they also may not.

It may well be that.

In

policy outcomes are sufficiently clear cut for

the model to be of some use to social scientists,
the assumptions are dubious or even clearly wrong.

even though some of
The theoretical

arguments that describe the possibility of blurring of the voter's
perception of costs and benefits do not preclude the validity of testing
the model.

^^ibid. , p.

90.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS

Economists have,

for a little over half a century

, attempted to

explain local government spending through statistical analysis.

The

first efforts were unguided by any identifiable behavioral theory.
However,

as work in the field proceeded,

progress was made both towards

better empirical estimation and the formulation of a guiding theory that
would allow economists to explain government spending in terms of
economic behavior,

as well as "explain" the variation of that spending

in a statistical sense.
As the following paragraphs will show, an income variable was
included in public expenditure models from the very beginning,

but it

was more than twenty years before economists began to think of income's
position in the model as being similar to that of income in a consumer's
demand function.
income,

Income was first specified as mean rather than median

and there was,

at first, no attempt to identify this income

v ariable w ith the motivations of any single voter or even a set of
voters.
Recognition of the importance of taxes was equally slow to come.
It was more than ten years after wor k on such models began to appear
that taxes,

in any form, were even mentioned.

Even then, a tax variable

was pa s s e d over for consideration as an independent variable,

and did

not reappear in public expenditure formulations until twenty years after
the first work on public expenditure analysis was done.

When a tax

17
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variable finally did come into use,

it was as "tax price," an element of

a somewhat dubious demand function for the decisive voter.
Besides the demand function variables of own-price and income,
political variables such as party competition and the size (and
supposedly strength) of interest groups were gradually introduced into
public expenditure models.

Such "political," as opposed to "economic,"

variables were intended to make the

dels sophisticated enough to

capture the expenditure variation which results from a complex budgeting
process.

UNGUIDED EMPIRICISM

One of the earliest notable attempts at statistical analysis of
public

expenditures was published in 1952.^^

explored interstate
data from 1942.

Solomon Fabricant

differences in public expenditures using Census

Because of the varying responsibilities of different

levels of government,

state and local expenditures were aggregated

wi t h i n each state.
Fabricant posited expenditures per capita as a function of average
per capita income,
population density.

the state's degree of urbanization,
Using ordinary least squares

72 percent of the interstate
capita.

and its

( O L S ) , he "explained"

variation in total expenditures per

He also determined that mean income was statistically the most

important of his explanatory variables,

with density being somewhat less

" S o l o m o n Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity in the U.S
Since 1900 (New York; National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952).
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significant

(both statistically and.

in his judgement,

theoretically),

and urbanization having only a small positive but statistically
insignificant effect on the dependent variable.
In fact,
anything is

Fabricant remarked that "there is a question whether
gained by including urbanization."^^

Although the author

emphasized the need for further research to analyze that portion of
expenditures per capita as yet "unexplained," he seemed quite pleased
with his model,
variables
them,

choice of variables,

and results.

He wrote,

"in the

selected we have the manor f a c t o r s , or representatives of

involved in interstate differences in government

activity.

(emphasis added)
The simplicity of F a b r i c a n t 's formulation shows how far removed
his model was from a true demand function.
explanatory variable,

Income was included as an

but his article showed no theoretical basis for

u sing this variable in the way it might be used in a demand function,
i.e.

as a measure of the voter's ability to pay for goods and services

received.

Another difference between F a b r i c a n t 's formulation and the

med i a n voter approach is that he chose to use mean income in each state
rather than median income, which is identified in the modern theory as
the Income of the decisive voter.

Of course, mean income could be

identified with a single voter just as easily as the median value, but
Fabricant made no such argument.

His model was also devoid of the price

variables one would expect to see in a demand function.

Ibid. , p.

The prices of

122.

^^Ibid. , p . 123 .
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complements and substitutes are normally thought to be an important part
of demand as well.

In the case of public expenditure analysis,

prices would be the prices of private goods and services.
intending to formulate a demand function,
^^fbually explained away,
services:

While never

Fabricant mentioned,

but

the effect of the prices of private goods and

Interstate variations

in price were too small to warrant their

specific inclusion in the model.
measure of income

these

Furthermore,

indicates differences

Fabricant stated,

. .our

in real per capita income plus

price differences."^®
The author's purpose was statistical estimation,

not theoretical

explanation of expenditures per capita, and apparently the collinearity
of prices and incomes was judged sufficient to make his model work.
independent variable's own-price,
found.

In fact.

its tax price,

The

was nowhere to be

Fabricant made only one fleeting reference to taxes; he

noted that increases

in real income would increase both the quantity of

public goods and services demanded and the tax capacity basic to their
supply.
Finally,
being

economists conceptualize demand for a good or service as

dependent on the individual's tastes and preferences.

Fabricant's urbanization and population density variables can indeed be
thought of as indicators of the preference for public goods and
services.

However,

they are not particularly good indicators

they were not in his specification).

(at least,

The coefficient for population

density was statistically significant for only five of ten functional

^®Ibid. , p. 128
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categories of government spending.

The urbanization coefficient was

statistically significant for only four of these functional categories
and insignificant in "explaining" total expenditures per capita.
Fabricant himself pointed out that other measures,
industrialization,

might have been used,

such as

but made no attempt to make use

of such v a r i a b l e s .
Despite these differences between Fabricant's formulation and a
median voter demand function,

it should not be inferred that Fabricant

was a poor social scientist.

Far from it.

identified income

Fabricant not only

(even if it was in somewhat different form) as the

major explanatory variable,

he

also was a pioneer in applying OLS to

the analysis of public expenditures.
These days it may seem quite natural that an economist could
conceive of expenditures for goods or services,
terms of demand for that good or service,

public or private,

in

(at least, many economists do

so, even though their conceptual models are often criticized for
oversimplification and excessive assumptions.)
public goods and services.
this.

However,

in the case of

Fabricant can not be blamed for not seeing

In 1952, pubic choice theory was still in its infancy.

It is

true that the first theoretical steps towards a theory of voter-guided
resource allocation had been made eight years previously, but there is
no reason to believe that Fabricant knew of even these beginnings.
economists,
a sense,

the theory of demand is founded on individual behavior.

For
In

it w ould have been premature of Fabricant to posit a proper

demand function wit h incomes, prices,

and tastes and preferences without

reference to a theory which described the behavior of the individual
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doing the demanding.

In any case, he certainly can not be faulted for

falling to develop the theory

of the median voter on his own.

In 1961, Glenn Fisher applied Fabricant's model to data extracted
from the 1957 Census of G o v e r n m e n t s .
Influence of differences

He noted the "widely recognized"

in per capita Income on variations in public

spending and added that differences In population density and
urbanization were somewhat less Important but were still "often
recognized as being factors which should be c o n s i d e r e d . F i s h e r ' s
model "explained" only 53 percent of the variation In total per capita
expenditures,

considerably less that Fabricant's seventy two percent.

Consequently, he suggested that historians,

political scientists, or

legal scholars familiar with the geographic region for which his model's
predictions were amiss would be able to help explain some of the
variation that statistical analysis was unable to "explain"
statistically.

For the most part,

the estimated coefficients conformed

in sign and size to Fisher's expectations.

For the 11 functional

expenditure categories explored, he found 8 negative coefficients for
the population density variable.
functior.- areas,
variable,
Again,

Of the equations for spending In

7 yielded positive coefficients for the urbanization

and 9 yielded positive coefficients for per capita Income.

the Income variable was much more statistically significant than

the other two Independent variables.
Because his model "explained"

less variation than Fabricant's,

Fisher was apparently somewhat discouraged.

He wrote

^^Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government
Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," National Tax Journal 24 (December
1961)

349.
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These coefficients are high enough to Indicate that multiple
regression analysis has made a substantial contribution to
explaining expenditure variation.
They are also low enough to
leave room for m uch further work.
Fisher closed by suggesting two possible additional independent
variables;

percentage of students attending private colleges

(for

estimating higher education expenditures) and percentage of students
attending parochial schools
schools).

(for estimating expenditures on local

He noted that the Income,

population density,

and urbanization

variables used yielded mixed results In the statistical estimation of
expenditures,
Variations

depending on the functional category estimated.

"unexplained" by his model offered, he felt,

"a fertile field

for further study, using either quantitative or non-quantltatlve
methods.
In 1963, Ernest Kurnow published the results of a revised model
tested on the same Census data used by Fisher.

Kurnow first changed the

F a b r i c a n t -Fisher additive model to a "joint regression model",
model In which all variables.

Independent and dependent,

by taking their natural logarithms.
to account for any Interactions,

of the Independent

Using the same 3 Independent

variables as Fabricant and Fisher had used, Kurnow
percent

are transformed

Such a transformation is Intended

or joint effects,

variables on the dependent variable.

I.e. a

"explained" 88

of the variation In the 1942 expenditure data and 78 percent of

the v a r i a t i o n In the 1957 figures.

^®Ibid. , p.

352.

^"Ibld. . p. 355.
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Confident that his joint regression model represented a significant
improvement over the mathematical form of the Fabricant-Fisher linear
model,

Kurnow then began making adjustments to the list of independent

variables.

He noted the increased reliance of state and local

governments

in the post-war period on federal grants - in-aid and thus

decided to add federal aid per capita

as an explanatory variable.

Kurnow also added the student-teacher

ratio in elementary schools as

proxy for the quality of public services.
density variable was deleted from the

Finally,

the population

model because it was found to be

highly correlated with urbanization but not

as good a predictor

variable.

Kurnow's joint regression model, with four independent

variables,

"explained" 81 percent of the variation in the 1957

expenditure figures.

a

He thus felt he had demonstrated the importance of

the proper choice of mathematical form and independent variables

in

estimating government expenditures.
It should be pointed out,
criticized.

though,

that this model has been

Elliot Morss has objected to the inclusion of federal aid

as an explanatory variable.

Because virtually all federal aid must be

spent by recipient governments,

the statistical significance of the

coefficient for aid was unsurprising and almost vacuous.

According to

Morss,
...little is to be gained from simply regressing the dependent
variable on itself or parts of i t s e l f . . . .using aid to explain
expenditures is analogous to using taxes to explain expenditures
in the sense that both aid and taxes are sources of funds.
The
fact that these variables turn out to have substantial
explanatory power serves as little more than verification of the
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quite obvious fact that government receipts and expenditures are
closely related.
In light of the Importance of tax price in the median voter's
demand function,

it is quite ironic that Morss would refer to the

possibility of using taxes as an independent variable in such a
disparaging way--statistically significant but uninteresting.
course,

the point he was making was correct.

Of

Public expenditure

analysis was taking a turn toward mindless number crunching,

in which

the only goal seemed to be to increase the predictive value of the
models.
Morss can hardly be credited with hitting on the appropriate price
variable

(or any price variable,

for that matter),

criticized the field's current lack of direction.

but he correctly
His major concern was

that recent studies in public expenditure analysis were geared too much
toward increasing a model's

"goodness of fit" and paid too little

a t tention to finding a behaviorally based explanation of public
expenditures.

A model geared toward this latter purpose would be of

m u c h more practical use to economists trying to understand government
finances and government officials trying to estimate revenue needs.
In 1964,
basic

Seymore Sacks and Robert Harris used Fabricant's

factors," per capita income, population density,

urbanization,

"three

and

to "explain" 53 percent of the variation in state and

^°Elliot R. Morss, "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of State and
Local Expenditures," National Tax Journal 29 (March 1966): 97,
21

Ibid.
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local expenditure figures from 1 9 6 0 .

The amount of variation

"explained" was almost precisely the amount "explained"
far below the amount "explained" by Fabricant.
focused on state and local governments'

Again,

by Fisher,

but

Sacks and Harris

increased reliance on

intergovernmental transfers to explain the increasingly poor performance
of the "three basic factors" model.

For this reason,

they felt

justified in adding federal and state transfer payments to the list of
explanatory variables.
regarded as

According to the authors,

'outside money'

local government,

"federal aid can be

from the point of view of the state and

and its availability should be expected to have a

direct impact on raising state and local expenditure l e v e l s .
State aid to local governments was a slightly different matter.
Because state aid is financed partially by internally raised taxes,
effect on expenditures would be ambiguous.

Thus,

its

the authors expected a

positive coefficient for the federal aid variable but had no
theoretically based expectations for the coefficient of the state aid
variable.
Sacks and Harris'

5 -variable model "explained" 87 percent of the

v a riation in per capita spending.

The inclusion of federal aid in the

model was found to be particularly helpful for the estimation of two
functional expenditure categories, highways and public welfare,

two

^^Seymore Sacks and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and
Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds,"
National Tax
Journal 27 (March 1964):

75.

z^Ibid.
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programs in which the federal government had taken an increasingly large
role.
The authors ended by endorsing three of the independent variables
in their model.

The emerging picture shows the dominant role of the two aid
variables and personal income in both total expenditures and in
the dollarwise most important categories.
Only in the case of
the smaller and definitely locally financed functions are
population density and percent urban statistically significant.
Given federal and state aid, the income variable is
statistically significant and positive in every case.^^
They also emphasized the importance of government's means of financing
to its level of spending.

"In effect,

it is impossible to explain the

fiscal activities of a state-local government without reference to the
other elements of the overall governmental system of which they are
component p a r t s .

FOCUS ON PERSONAL INCOME AND TAXES

Fisher published another study in 1954 which,
included

seven of twelve variables considered.

considered are of

particular note.

did not include in his

in its final form,
Two variables

Fisher considered, but ultimately

model, median family income.

Without reference

to any theory of the median voter, he reasoned
the existence of a few very high income persons in a state would
substantially raise the per capita income figure but would have
little effect upon the median income.
These high incomes, of
course, represent taxpaying ability and, to the extent that the

2^Ibid. , p. 82.
^^Ibid. , p . 85 .
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tax system of the state is able to tap that income, may affect
the level of government expenditure.^®

Thus,

Fisher had considered precisely the measure of income used in

median voter public expenditure demand functions,
to attain a model that might

but had done so merely

"fit" the data better.

It is also

encouraging that he mentioned the ability of voters to pay taxes.
However,

as mentioned above, he ultimately eliminated this variable from

the model.

He did, however,

as an explanatory variable.

include a measure

of income distribution

His theoretically based expectations for

the coefficient of the percent of families earning under $2,000 were
ambiguous.

Fisher reasoned "...the existence of a large number of low

income persons would generally exert downward pressure on government
expenditure,

but, at the same time would result in greater

'need' for

certain specific expenditures such as public w e l f a r e . L o w

income

people were thought to feel the bite of the relatively regressive state
and

local tax structures more than the affluent.

greater political resistance to higher

Thus, there would

be

taxes among this group of voters.

In light of the previous absence of a price or price-like variable,
it is even more encouraging that Fisher did include a tax-related
variable,
is "...

the per capita yield of a representative property tax, which

an estimate of the amount of revenue which would be produced if

each state levied a representative tax upon property assessed at a

^®Glen W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local
Government Expenditure," National Tax Journal 27 (March 1964); 61
Ibid.
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uniform percentage of true value.^8

Fisher evidently was thinking of

the voter's ability to pay and the government's ability to raise money,
but he still had not come to the point of conceiving government spending
as a response to the voters' wishes.
Fisher measured the voters'

Indeed, the tax measure used by

ability to pay, but not the price they

actually were required to pay, a very important feature of an economic
demand function.
In addition to these 2 "economic" variables,
variables,

3 "demographic"

and 2 "socio-political" variables were included as

explanatory variables.
percent urban,

The "demographic" variables--population density,

and percent increase in population over the previous

decade--as well as the
party competition,

"socio-political" variables--a measure of two

and percent of the population over 25 with fewer than

5 years of schooling--turned out to be statistically insignificant in
estimating the total expenditures per capita.

These latter five

variables were

also only fair to poor predictors In the estimations for

the functional

categories.

Thus, the "economic" variables dominated

the

m odel statistically.
Finally,

Fisher had "serious doubts about the validity of using

federal aid as an Independent variable"
of public

expenditures.29

Although a federal aid variable considerably

Increased the amount of variation
considered the

"feedback

28ibid. , p.p.

in a multiple regression model

"explained"

In earlier models, he

effect" of federal aid on expenditures per

61-2 .

29lbld. , p - 72 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

capita too large for a valid

specification.

Thus,

Fisher discarded the

aid variable.
A 1965 study by Roy Bahl and Robert Saunders added what they saw
a further methodological refinement to public expenditure analysis.
Rather than estimate absolute levels of spending per capita,

the authors

proposed estimating the changes in spending per capita as a function of
the changes in the independent variables.
represented substantial progress,
sense,

Theoretically,

according to Bahl and Saunders.

it definitely did represent theoretical progress.

that Bahl and Saunders were thinking in terms of voters'
governments'

this
In a

It indicated
and

response to past conditions.

The results of the empirical test of the authors' model, however,
were not so impressive.

Using Census data for the years 1957 and 1960,

the authors found that change in per capita federal grants to states was
the onl y statistically significant variable

in a model containing other

independent variables.
Bahl and Saunders then tested their model on a subsample of states.
They

reasoned that "a breakdown into a smaller group of states having

certain

homogeneous traits may increase the proportion of variation of

expenditures which can be e x p l a i n e d .

The traits chosen for study

were population density and per capita income.

A group of 15 states

w i t h densities over 65 persons per square mile and per capita incomes

30&oy W. Bahl and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Changes
State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal 28
(March, 1965): 50-7.
3ilbid. , p.

55 .
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over $2,000 was selected.

Because only high income-high density states

were included in the subsample,
variables.

the model partially controlled for these

(It should be noted, however,

that specific inclusion of

income and density as independent variables would have controlled for
these variables far more precisely.)
The 5 -variable model "explained" less of the variation in change

in

total spending for the 15 selected states than for the 48 states, but
the subsample estimation was more successful in "explaining" the
variations

in spending change broken down by function.

The influence of

federal grants was substantially reduced in the high income-high density
group,

indicating that federal aid is a less powerful predictor for

spending changes
other words,

in

jurisdictions characterized by such traits.

more affluent

In

jurisdictions seemed to establish their own

preference for public goods with less regard to federal largesse than
did poorer jurisdictions.
Despite the fact that Bahl and Saunders
of

"explained" only 31 percent

the variation of the expenditure change--and this only for a 15-

state subsample--they felt their model was successful.
had

"explained"

levels of spending, not changes

were not strictly comparable.

Previous models

in spending,

and thus

Non-longitudinal cross-sectional studies

simply did not address the practical problems of state and local
government planning.

Thus,

the authors felt they had suggested a

fruitful area for further research for economists and other social
scientists.
A 1966 study by James Barr and Otto Davis added little to the body
of empirical wor k in government expenditure analysis,

but laid much of
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the theoretical groundwork to be used

garr and Davis presented

l a t e r .

logical and mathematical arguments that voters could and inoeed did
attempt to maximize their personal utilities--subject to their incomes,
the prices of private goods and services,

and the prices of public goods

and services--through the votes they cast.

Thus the authors explicitly

recognized that public goods and services,

as well as the "prices" paid

for them,

entered into the calculation of one's utility.

formulation,

In this

public goods and services were figured in to the utility

function in much the same way as private goods and services.

There was

also an argument that politicians sought to remain in office and a
mathematical proof which,

the authors asserted,

demonstrated that the

surest wa y to do so was to appeal to the preferences of the median
voter.
Income and price appeared in the model and they considered it a
true demand function,

although it was based on admittedly simplistic

assumptions concerning the political process of budgeting.

However,

model was not yet ready for testing, according to the authors;

the

they felt

it untestable because the median voter's preferences were unobservable
and the median voter in different jurisdictions would have different
incomes as well as differing tastes and preferences.

(Barr and Davis

did not go so far as to identify the voter at the political median with
the v o t e r at the economic median.)

32james L. Barr and Otto A. Davis, "An Elementary Political and
Economic Theory of the Expenditures of Local Governments," Southern
Economic Journal 33 (October 1966): 149-65.
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A simplified version of the model was tested for Pennsylvania
counties,

but with only countywlde taxable value and the ratio of owner-

occupied homes to registered voters as Independent variables,
results were of little practical use.

the

The estimated coefficients were

of the correct sign and usually statistically significant, but only a
small portion of the variation of the expenditure variable was
statistically "explained."

Curiously,

the addition of income as an

explanatory variable did not improve the explanatory power of the model.
In 1967 Ira Sharkansky,

a political scientist,

estimated government

expenditure with a model that accounted for the spending of previous
years.

He thus acknowledged that government budgets are often

established through what is known as an "Incremental" process.
Sharkansky's dependent variable was state expenditures per capita
1963), not aggregated state and local spending.
variables were per capita personal income,
of state government revenue,
p e r sonal Income

(for

His Independent

federal aid as a proportion

state and local taxes as a proportion of

(Sharkansky's measure of "tax effort"),

the proportion

of state and local spending done by states, and previous state
expenditures.
Personal Income had a role In public expenditure models since the
time of Fabricant's formulation,

but Its place In the model had never

b een given a theoretical justification.
included his

Income

Sharkansky specifically

variable because he felt it to be a measure of

"economic development."

Thus,

Sharkansky's behavioral justification for

including an income measure was not the same as the justification given
it by proponents of the median voter model.

Despite this difference in
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behavioral approaches,

the use of a measure of tax effort represented a

significant theoretical step.

Tax effort was included because "...it

measures the level of economic support given to state and local
governments by citizens,

and thereby stands as an indicator of popular

support for government services."”

Surprisingly,

though,

the

coefficient for tax effort was not statistically significant in the
estimation of total spending or spending in any functional category.
The use of previous expenditures as a predictive variable says more
than simply that the future will be similar to the past.

Political

scientists have long thought of government budgeting as incremental.
Apart from the Influence of "force of habit,"

the level of previous

spending
...may work its influence through the formal process of
budgeting and ap p r o p r i a t i o n s .... the techniques of incremental
budgeting place great weight on previous expenditures in the
determination of current exp e n d i t u r e s .... The (expenditure) base
serves as the starting point for calculations among those
who
ask for funds, and the base serves as the portion of a request
that is most likely to be considered legitimate by those who
review appropriations.^"

Furthermore,

as Robert Harlow has pointed out,

last year's expenditures

can be thought of as a proxy for the combined effect of all the
political forces,
process,

formal and informal, which enter into the budgetary

as well as economic and demographic c o n d i t i o n s .

33%ra Sharkansky, "Some More Thoughts About the Determinants of
Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal 30 (June, 1967); 171.

34ibid.
^^Robert L. Harlow, "Sharkansky on State Expenditures:
31 National Tax Journal 31 (June, 1968) p. 215.
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The coefficient of the previous expenditure variable in
Sharkansky's study was positive and quite significant for all spending
categories

estimated.

However,

this variable is of limited practical

use since it represents the compounded effect of several separate
forces.

In fact, previous expenditures seems to be too powerful a

predictor;

when it is included in a multiple regression model, variables

that were previously statistically significant and theoretically
important,

such as income,

become statistically insignificant.

In 1968, David Smith published the results of a 50-state
cross-sectional expenditure analysis based on a "political approach to
tax and expenditure decision making."^®
of the elements of public choice theory.

Smith's model was based on many
7 r instance, he worked from

the assumption that elected officials seek to maximize the probability
of their re-election,

i.e.

they attempt to maximize their votes.

Furthermore, he assumed that individuals had different "demands" for
public goods and services and were able to make these demands known
through the election of public officials.
Smith's unit of analysis, however, was the governmental unit,
specifically the governmental unit receiving a federal grant-in-aid,
not the individual t a x p a y e r - v o t e r .

Consequently,

and

he recognized the

disutility associated with the taxes needed to support public
expenditures.

However,

this disutility was that faced by the legislator

v oting to levy the tax.

^®David L. Smith, "The Response of State and Local Governments to
Federal Grants," 31 National Tax Journal 31 (September 1968) 350.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36

Smith's analysis did contain a price variable,

of sorts, but not

the tax price of recent public expenditure analysis.
was the expenditure response of recipient governments;

His major concern
he maintained

that "the basic feature of a conditional matching grant is that it has
the effect of reducing the price of a specific governmental service to a
lower-level g o v e r n m e n t " .

Because public goods and services were

generally not produced in physical units that were "sold" to the public,
it was

impossible to quantify either a unit or a price for them.

However,

Smith assumed the recipient government's expenditure response

to a federal grant was analogous to a price elasticity of demand for the
aided function and the "grant elasticity of expenditure" yielded a proxy
price faced by the recipient.
model.

Using a log-linear multiple regression

Smith estimated per capita state and local government

expenditures as a function of five independent variables,

all of which,

except percent of population 65 or over, have been discussed in
reference to earlier studies.

He "explained"

79 percent of the

v a r i a t i o n in the general expenditures.
Because the focus of Smith's study was the behavioral effect of
grants on governments,

not voters, his conclusions are of limited value

in constructing a demand function that describes the median voter's
preference for public goods.
however,

The reasoning used to build the model,

bears a striking resemblance to that used in modern public

c h o i ce-median voter models.

3?rbid., p.

351
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A PROPOSAL FOR A TRUE DEMAND FUNCTION

In
to

1973, Theodore Bergstrom and Robert Goodman published an attempt

"develop a method for estimating

municipal public services."^®

demand functions of individuals

The model was based on the theory that

demand will depend on the traditional variables,
well as on certain

for

price and income.

as

demographic characteristics of the individual and

the city in which he lives'*.®^ (emphasis added)
The authors listed a set of assumptions on which their model was
based.

They can be summarized as the following

1)

The production of public goods and services
cost industry.

is a constant

2)

Every consumer of public goods pays a tax s h a r e . a fraction
of the total cost of public expenditures in the community.
This tax share may be based on the consumer's wealth, his
or her income, or other individual characteristics, but it
does not vary with public expenditures or the way in which
the desire for public goods and services is expressed.

3)

Every consumer of public goods and services has a tax p r i c e ,
the product of his tax share and the total cost of the public
goods and services in question, and is able to determine the
quantity of the public commodity which he would choose for the
community given that he must pay his share of the cost.
To
do this he needs to maximize his own utility subject to a
budget constraint containing this tax price.

4)

In each jurisdiction, the quantity supplied of the public
good or service in question is equal to the median of the
quantities demanded by its citizens.
In other words, the
government responds to the median set of quantity preferences
in its supply of public goods and services.

®®Theodore C. Bergstrom and Robert P. Goodman, "Private Demand for
Public Goods," American Economic Review 63 (June 1973): 280.
®^Ibid.
40lbid., p.p.

280-1.
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5)

In each jurisdiction, the median of the quantities demanded
is the quantity demanded by the citizen with the median i n c o m e
in that jurisdiction.

Assumptions four and five allow one to v iew the quantity of public goods
chosen
that

by the jurisdiction through the political process as the amount

is desired by the consumer with the median income.

Assumptions one

and two allow public expenditures to be treated as observations
quantity demanded)

on the demand curve of a consumer of public goods who

has the median income in his community.
goods

(of the

The own-price of those public

is proportional to the tax share (assumption three).
All together,

the assumptions posit public expenditures as a

function of the "traditional economic variables,

price and income."

Bergstrom and Goodman noted that the first four of these assumptions had
been proposed and studied by Howard Bowen in 1 9 4 3 . and again by James
Barr and Otto Davis
more questionable,

in 1966.

Additional assumptions, which seem even

are that the prices of private goods and the unit

costs of public goods are the same in each jurisdiction observed.
The only one of their variables which Bergstrom and Goodman felt
nee d e d
price).

explanation was tax share (which,
In

again,

is proportional to tax

order to have a true demand function,

must be thought

the voter-consumer

to respond to a perceived price for public goods.

'•^Howard H. Bowen, "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation
of Economic Resources," Quarterly Journal of Economics 53 (November
1943): 27-48. Bowen attempted to delineate the conditions under which
democratic voting might produce "the ideal output of a social good,"
Mo d e r n public choice-median voter theory does not require this social
optimum.
Indeed, it generally will not be attained, according to the
mo d e r n theory.
However, Bowen's wor k did outline underlying assumptions
still used today.
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While most people do not

know their tax share, most have a pretty good

idea of the total tax bill they receive every year.
If one were to ask several individuals what their tax shares
are, we suspect that few would be able to answer the question
sensibly without more reflection than usually takes place before
voting.
Nevertheless, they may have knowledge which is for our
purposes equivalent.
For example, if a citizen knows his
municipal tax bill and believes that his taxes will change in
proportion to municipal expenditures, he will know the cost to
hi m of a given percentage change in municipal expenditures.'’’
Bergstrom and Goodman tested their theoretical model by estimating,
with a log-linear regression model,
826 medium-sized American cities.

three functional expenditures for
They were pleased to discover that

their estimates of income elasticities were usually positive and
statistically significant and estimates of price elasticity usually
negative and significant.

In no case were any estimated elasticities of

the theoretically incorrect sign and statistically significant.

Thus,

the "traditional" variables of income and price appeared to be acting in
the model as economic theory would predict.

The estimated elasticity

for population was everywhere positive and almost
significant.

always statistically

The coefficient for percent population change was

virtually everywhere negative and statistically significant about half
of the time.

The authors explained this response to population change

as a failure to achieve "political equilibrium".*^

Time

is required for

a rapidly growing or declining city to adjust its level of expenditures,
and such cities apparently were not adjusting their expenditures as
rapidly as their populations might warrant.

*^Bergstrom and Goodman,
*3lbid., p.

p. 284.

290.
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Six other Independent variables were used in the Bergstrora-Goodman
model.

One of those is of particular relevance to a the present study,

which attempts to examine the effect of economic growth on public
expenditures.

The ratio of employment to residential property owners

was used as an indicator of a community's commercial or industrial
activity.

Bergstrom and Goodman hypothesized that larger amounts of

public goods and services must be provided by a local government in
order to attract and retain such activity.

This hypothesized

relationship was apparently borne out by the estimates;
elasticity for this variable was usually positive,

the estimated

and always positive

wherever statistically significant.
Douglas Booth's 1978 article about the simultaneous effects of
economic growth on public expenditures and the tax base is particularly
germane to any investigation of the fiscal

impacts of economic growth.

Booth's study was designed to explore the relationship between a city's
employment base and its fiscal health.

His model was based on the

insight that two kinds of economic change,
ma n u facturing or mercantile activity,

growth or decline in either

affect both the desire and need

for public services and the local government's means for paying for such
services.

(Booth used per capita employment to represent commercial and

industrial activity: manufacturing activity was represented by
m a n u facturing employment and mercantile activity by employment in
services and wholesale and retail trade.)

Thus, he estimated two

functions--one to "explain" public expenditures and one to "explain" the
tax price faced by

voters.
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Although he recognized the roles of politicians and voters,
outlined

previously,

in the process of determining public spending,

Booth felt the median voter model somewhat unrealistic because
to include the influence of interest groups.
vote

as

it failed

Because each citizen's

is only one among several, he has little reason to spend a great

deal of time and energy becoming informed about political and
governmental matters;

he remains

"rationally ignorant" on many issues

and is easily influenced by political information received,
from politicians or special interest groups.

at no cost,

Booth also recognized the

importance of the economic role of local government and felt that this
role should be accounted for in the expenditure model.
The ability of the municipal politician to retain political
office hinges in large measure on the smooth functioning of
local economic i n s t itutions. This requires that municipal
services be kept within certain bounds.
On the one hand, the
consequence of Inadequate levels of municipal expenditures
and
services would be significant damage to the local economic base
from such problems as high crime rates, traffic congestion, high
incidence of property damage from fires, and a poorly educated
population.
On the other hand, if municipal expenditures are
excessive, municipal taxes would become so burdensome on
h o u sehold budgets as to impinge on consumption of private
commodities necessary to an orderly functioning of economic
life.
Excessive taxes could also impinge on business profits
in a municipality, disrupting the accumulation of business
we a l t h and curtailing local employment.'*'' (emphasis added)
Individual voters will generally be much more aware of their tax bills
and

public expenditures than they will be about the full array of

public goods and services.

On the other hand,

organized interests will

have their own particular objectives and will take pains to become

'•"Douglas E. Booth, "The Differential Impact of Manufacturing and
M e rcantile Activity on Local Government Expenditures and Revenues,"
National Tax Journal 32 (March 1978): 34.
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informed of the benefits

(to themselves) of public goods and services.

According to such reasoning,

any model that fails to Include interest

groups will be greatly m i s s p e c i f i e d ; voters, who will tend to want to
hold the line on taxes and expenditures,
by interest groups,
employee unions,

should be balanced in the model

such as downtown merchants associations,

public

and neighborhood organizations, whose members will

lobby for specific public goods and services.
Booth's empirical model of public spending included only six
independent variables.

He used population and population density as

"environmental variables" which acted as "constraints on the municipal
service production process in service supply d e c i s i o n s . B o o t h

felt

it likely that the per capita cost schedule for a particular service
with respect to population was U-shaped,
providing services,

implying that the costs of

and the expenditures necessitated by those costs,

varied with population and eventually reached a turning point at which
diseconomies of size began to predominate.

Because congestion problems

appear and begin to increase at some point, population density was felt
to have a conceptually similar impact on costs.

Thus,

the sign on these

coefficients could not be predicted a priori.
Booth's

insights

into the politics of government spending,

as the production realities of the public sector,

as well

led him to include

both manufacturing and mercantile employment per capita as independent
variables

in his expenditure regression.

They served as measures of the

level of business activity and consequent demand for business-related

45lbid.
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services.

They also

served as a proxy for the political clout of the

business community.
The
included,

"economic" variables of income and tax share were also
although it should be noted that their specifications were not

the same as those found in models like the Bergstrom and Goodman model.
A lthough Booth was quite aware of the theory that politicians respond to
the demands of the median voter, he used mean rather than median family
income in his model.

He

"Iso used the ratio of residential assessed

value to total assessed value as his measure of tax share, thus
specifying a variable proportional to the mean rather than median tax
price.
Booth's linear regression model tested a cross section of 47 medium
to large Wisconsin cities using 1970 data.
limited confirmation
coefficients for
expected,

The results gave only

of the theoretical assumptions used.

The

the mercantile employment variable were positive,

as

and statistically significant for all three functional areas

e x a m i n e d - - p o l i c e , fire,

and school expenditures.

the manufacturing variable,

The coefficients for

surprisingly, were in all cases positive,

but statistically significant only in the regression for police
expenditures.
Coefficients for the income variable were all positive, but
significant only

for estimating police and school spending.

The

coefficients for

tax share were negative--seeming to affirm the negative

re l a t ionship of price and quantity which economists usually expect--and
statistically significant for spending on fire protection and school
spending.

They were positive and insignificant for spending on police
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protection.

The model "explained" only 47,

v a riation in fire, police,

57, and 67 percent of the

and school spending respectively.

The second regression in the model had the tax price (technically,
the tax share) as a function of two previously used variables,
manufacturing and

mercantile employment per capita.

elasticities were negative

Both employment

and statistically significant, and 57

percent of the variation in tax price

was "explained" by the model.

Feeling that his two regressions adequately reflected the
determination of public spending and tax price.
elasticities to compute the changes

Booth used the estimated

in residential tax bills and public

spending that would accompany employment growth.

He reasoned that the

impact of an added employee on the residential tax bill could be
expressed as
e , a t / + t(6e,/8n, +

where

d e j d t

■

8t/anJ

is the expenditure for function 1, and nj is the ratio of

manufacturing employment to population for j = manufacturing and the
ratio of

mercantile employment to population for j = mercantile.

The

residential share of taxes required for financing municipal services is
represented as t.

The first component of the expression is the change

in the residential tax bill that results from the change in the
residential tax share.

The second component is the change in the

residential tax bill that results from a change
capita.

Changes

in the expenditure per

in public expenditures as employment grows or declines

can be represented with the following expression:

dejBt ■dt/dn^.
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Booth calculated the tax price and expenditure effects of
employment change based on the above expressions and the average values
of expenditures and tax share for the sample.

He concluded that,

if

political and tax base mobility effects were small enough to be ignored,
manufacturing activity had a beneficial impact on local government,
reducing taxes while

increasing expenditures on local residents.

Mercantile activity,

though, had a harmful fiscal impact, causing taxes

to increase by a greater proportion than the increase in expenditures on
services.
Of course.

Booth realized that the effects of politics and tax base

m o b ility could not be ignored in the real world,
conclusions quite tentative.

and thus considered his

Yet he felt that If his results were

r eplicated In other studies his model could very well be used to
describe the fiscal plight of many older cities.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE STATISTICAL MODEL

LESSONS FROM PAST STUDIES

The successes and failures of past empirical work on the estimation
public expenditures,
lessons useful

outlined in the previous chapter, provide many

in the construction of a model intended to explore the

effects of economic growth on local government spending.

This chapter

will describe such a model developed with these lessons in mind.
âll of the previous work mentioned,

As in

ordinary least squares will be used

to statistically estimate the effects of a set of independent variables
on a set of measures of government spending.

Cross-sectional analysis

of expenditures will be performed on expenditure figures for 54 of the
56 county governments

in Montana.

Previous studies often analyzed state and local expenditures
aggregated together.

This was necessary for nation-wide studies,

because of the difficulty of distinguishing between State and local
responsibilities in the various states.

This aggregation problem can be

overcome by focusing the analysis on the expenditures of Montana county
governments alone,

since counties in Montana have similar

responsibilities for providing public goods and services and are bound
by similar State laws.
Such a focus has an important additional advantage.
that the voter/consumer determines public expenditures,

To the degree
aggregation of

46
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state and local expenditures only compounds the problems of estimation.
The voter/consumers of the various States are far more likely to have
dissimilar tastes and preferences than those of the a single State.
Statistical analysis of government expenditures

in the single state is

less likely to be complicated by unknown and unmeasured differences
taxpayer preferences;

in

Montanans are simply more likely to be homogeneous

in their preferences than are Americans as a whole.
Also,

as in previous studies of this nature,

for general expenditures,
areas, will be estimated.

equations accounting

as well as expenditures in several functional
For reasons to be explained below,

the variables will not be used to measure expenditures

some of

in the functional

areas.
Because there

is no theoretical guide as to the correct

mathematical form of the equation,
linear,

two common forms,

will be estimated and reported.

more appropriate
dependent

the linear and log-

The linear function will be

if the independent variables are thought to affect the

in an additive way.

The log-linear form will be useful in the

interpretation of any joint effects of the independent variables on the
dependent variable.

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variables used will be various measures of aggregate
county expenditures for fiscal year 1981-82.

This means there will be a

lag of approximately nine months between the observation times of my
dependent and major independent variables.

Some lag time, however.
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seems appropriate to allow time for voters to react to changing economic
conditions,

and the timing of the Census Bureau's collection of data

makes these dates most convenient.

Because the goods

public goods and are characterized,

to some degree, by jointness

consumption and production,

in question are
in both

it is quite possible that aggregate

expenditures rather than expenditures per capita is the more appropriate
form of the dependent variable.

The appropriate proxy for the quantity

of public goods demanded will be expenditures per capita if the median
voter perceives the utility of each unit of the public good provided as
being diminished by the use of other citizens.
perceives no such crowding effect,
quantity is aggregate expenditures.
public goods,

the more appropriate proxy for
Of course,

there are very few pure

and the public goods provided by county governments,

as roads and police and firm protection,
effects of crowding at some point.
here.

If the median voter

such

are especially prone to the

Economic theory is not decisive

Whether the expenditures of county governments are more

a p p r opriat ely modeled as aggregate expenditures or expenditures per
capital is an empirical question.

The answer to this question is

probably not the same for all county expenditures in all places and
times.
In order to help resolve this matter,
was constructed,
1980's.

a data set for fiscal 1971-72

using the same variables as in the data set for the

This data set was used to estimate,

for purposes of comparison,

b o t h aggregate general expenditures and expenditures per capita.

The

m odel for aggregate expenditures provided a better statistical "fit" to
the data than did the expenditures per capita model.

The model using
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expenditures per capita yielded an

of 0.70,

Indicating that 70

percent of the variation in expenditures per capita were
the model.

"explained" by

An indicator of the model's overall explanatory ability,

F statistic,

was 8.03; However,

the

the model for aggregate expenditures

"explained" about 85 percent of the variation of the dependent variable;
the value of
was 19.06.

for this equation was 0.85 and that of the F statistic
Because of the statistical superiority of the aggregate

expenditures formulation,

it was decided to use aggregate expenditure

measures in the 1 9 8 0 's models of both general and functional
expenditures.
The authors of past studies of a similar nature have used
expenditures per capita as the dependent variable,

so it was somewhat

surprising to find that such a large improvement in the model's
statistical "fit" could be made by departing from the usual form.
Furthermore,

this departure means the results from this study will not

be entirely comparable to past work in the area.
seems justified;

Yet such a departure

the improvement in statistical estimates is very likely

an indicator that public goods and services provided by Montana
counties,

and perhaps by other local governments, are more public,

less subject to crowding effects,

i.e.

than was previously implied by the

expenditures per capita formulation.

This could be because previous

researchers simply used the worse of the two forms.

It could also very

well be a function of Montana's relatively sparse population;

perhaps

crowding effects simply are not yet felt by the median voters

in

Montana's counties.
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Estimates will be made for general expenditures
expenditures

(GENX) as well as

in the functional areas of education (EDUC), highways

(HIWA), welfare

(WE L F ) . hospitals

(HOSP), health (HEAL), police

(POLI),

natural resources and parks and recreation (NRPR), and all other (OTHR),
a catch-all category that includes correction,
general control,
spending,

public buildings,

financial administration,

ir-erest on debt, unallocable

and sewerage and sanitation.

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Population or population density has traditionally been included- in
such models.

They have usually been found to be statistically

significant and can be interpreted as taste and preference variables.
This model will use 1980 population (PP) and the percentage of the
population living in urban areas in that year
variables.

(RB) as independent

The estimated coefficients for these variables are expected

to be positive.

It is reasonable to assume that those living in more

populous areas will prefer more of certain public goods and services,
like paved streets and police protection,
densely populated areas.

than those living in less

It is also equally likely that city dwellers

prefer and have the leisure to enjoy a wider variety of public goods and
services,

such as parks, m u s e u m s , libraries,

etc.

Finally,

those who

require public assistance of some sort will likely migrate to densely
p o p ulated areas,

since public assistance is generally more readily

available and available
Also,

in more generous quantities in urban areas.

urbanites ma y well have fewer, or at least different,
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living alternatives available to them and may thus be reliant on a
different mi x of public goods with a different price tag.
According to the median voter model outlined in Chapter Two, a proper
specification must
"tax price"

include the traditional demand function variables of

(TS) and median income in the county (MY).

as was explained before,

Median income,

is used because it is supposed to be the income

of the decisive voter in the community.

The income variable chosen for

this model is median family income in each county in 1979.
coefficient for this variable is expected to be positive.

The
The magnitude

of the coefficient will certainly vary from one geographic area to
another and the wide variation of estimated income elasticities in past
studies makes prediction of the coefficient's magnitude precarious.
The tax price is in truth a tax share : it is computed as the 1980
taxable value of the home with the median value
the decisive voter)
in that year.
be negative.

(assumed to belong to

divided by the taxable value of the entire tax base

The estimated coefficient for this "price" is expected to
However,

the completeness of this formulation of "price"

is somewhat questionable.

On the one hand,

the variable seems

appropriate because the property tax is the major own-source tax revenue
available to Montana counties and the only tax for which the county
commissioners

(presumably)

can be held responsible by the voters.

Counties in Montana receive shares of some of the State's excise taxes,
such as those on alcohol and gasoline,

but those shares are relatively

small w h e n compared to the revenues produced by the property tax.
even though these taxes are paid by the residents of the counties,
c ounty voters probably do not perceive the connection between these
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excise taxes and the goods and services provided by county governments.
Thus, any tax price variable constructed for

county voters should

indeed be based on property v a l u e s .
A problem arises, however,

in that a substantial amount of the

taxed property is owned by nonresidents of the counties containing
property.

The owners of such property must pay taxes but do not get to

vote for (or against)
against taxable value.

the county commissioners who levy the mills
Because the tax levy is a function of all

taxable property in the jurisdiction, not just that owned by residents,
the resident's perception of property taxes as a "price" paid for public
goods and services received is blurred.

The county's voters do not have

to bear the entirety of even the tax-financed portion of the cost of
publicly provided goods and services,

let alone the portion financed

through non-tax revenues.
Since this "tax price" variable is a very imperfect measure of what
taxpayers actually pay for their public goods,

additional explanatory

variables will be included to help account for the voters' ability to
make nonresidents pay for the public goods and services enjoyed by
residents.

A proxy for the ability of taxpayers to export taxes to

nonresidents

(XP) will be included as an explanatory variable.

This

p roxy will consist of the proportion of the county's property tax base
composed of net and gross proceeds,
property.

mining royalties,

and utility

This portion of the property tax base is the portion most

likely owned by nonresidents.
pr o p e r t y in the jurisdiction,

The higher the proportion of this kind of
the more likely residents will be to
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approve of higher county government expenditures.

The co ef fi c ie nt for

this variable is expected to be positive.
The absolute size of the county's tax base per capita will also be
included in the

model

(TB).

It is expected that voters will wish to

make not only nonresidents but also other residents pay for their public
goods and services.

The fact that a uniform county mill levy is applied

to all taxable property in the jurisdiction allows the voter to spread
the cost of public goods among all taxpayers,

regardless of residence.

Assuming the non-tax portion of the financing for public goods remains
unchanged,

the larger the tax base the lower the cost to the individual

for a particular level of public expenditure.
well as the ability to export taxes,

Thus,

the tax base,

as

can be thought of as supplements of

sorts to the "tax price;" they acts a other indicators of the marginal
cost accruing to the taxpayer/voter for his or her public goods and
services.
wealth.

These two variables can also be thought of as indicators of
They represent the wealth available for use by the taxpayer,

regardless of the portion of that wealth he or she owns.

Regardless of

whether these variables are thought of as (inversely proportional)
indicators of marginal cost,

indicators of wealth, or both,

their

estimated coefficients should be expected to be positive.
The distribution of income in the jurisdiction is expected to
affect the level of public expenditures,

although economic theory is of

little hel p in determining the direction or magnitude of this
relationship.

The proportion of the county's families living below the

federally defined poverty level (PV) will be used to measure such
distribution.

On the one hand,

the greater this proportion,
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the nee d for public goods such as welfare and possibly certain types of
public he a l t h expenditures.

In fact,

state and federal laws may,

in

effect, mandate some proportionality between this measure of income and
welfare spending.

Furthermore,

the median voter may very well have

feelings of "public regardingness" towards those living in poverty and
may choose to subsidize them.

However,

in the unlikely case that the

median voter has an income which places him below the poverty level, he
will be less willing and /or able to support such expenditures.

No

expectations for the size or sign of this coefficient are hypothesized.
The diversity of funding for county government necessitates that
n on-tax sources of revenue be accounted for in the model.

Thus

intergovernmental transfer payments from the State and federal
governments

(TF) and charges and miscellaneous fees (CG) for fiscal 1982

are Included as Independent variables.

Inclusion of these variables in

all of the equations would be preferred,
least, no way was found)

but it is not possible

(at

to disaggregate these amounts according to the

functional spending categories used.

Thus,

It will only be appropriate

to use these two variables for the general expenditures equation.
It Is likely that both of these types of funds are thought of as "free"
m o n e y by the voter.

This,

of course,

is not strictly true.

Taxpayers

In the county pay a small portion of the taxes which finance grants from
hi g h e r levels of government,

but they probably do not perceive the

connection between these taxes paid to the State and federal governments
and the financing of county-provided goods and services.
do see the connection,

Even if they

they are likely to perceive such financing as

another wa y of having nonresidents pay for a larger share of local goods
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and services.
indicators.

Such transfers can also be thought of as price
They allow voter/consumers to acquire more public goods

without incurring greater costs.*®
The estimated coefficient for intergovernmental transfer payments
is expected to be positive
models.

in both the linear and log-linear regression

Because much of such transfer payments come with matching funds

requirements,

the coefficient is expected to be greater than unity in

the linear model.

Charges and fees are also very likely seen as quite

different from taxes,

as they are not mandatory.

The estimated

coefficient for this variable is also expected to be positive in both
the linear and log-linear equations,

but nothing can be said of its

expected magnitude.
Finally,

two independent variables will be included in the model to

test the maintained hypothesis of this study--that employment growth
affects

local government expenditures in a positive way.

Employment

growth will be measured as percentage changes in employment over a tenyear period,
used.

1970 to 1980.

Two broad employment categories will be

Employment in basic Industries

(BA) will measure the percentage

change in the number of employed persons in the areas of a g r i c ulture,
forestry,

fisheries,

mining,

construction, manufacturing,

*®Following Smith's reasoning, such transfers are also seen as
prices by government.
However, their effect from local governments'
perspective is to reduce the cost of supplying additional public goods
and services.
For Smith, transfer payments were a supply variable.
Yet
they are here included in the median voter's demand schedule.
That a
"price" (marginal cost) variable appears in both supply and demand
functions should not be surprising, as price does double duty in the
supply/demand system for private goods and services.
This same
reasoning can be applied to the variables representing the size of the
tax base, the ability to export taxes, and charges and fees.
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transportation,

communication,

and utilities.

Employment change in all

other industries constitutes nonbasic employment

(NB ) . The changes

in

employment will be calculated as the 1980 employment figure less the
1970 employment figure,

all divided by the 1970 figure.

The estimated

coefficients are expected to be positive for both of these variables.
Growth in employment should create a need for public services and make
the electorate more optimistic about its ability to maintain a higher
level of public expenditures.

These variables could conceivably be

thought of also as indicators of the political strength of business.
Previous researchers have reasoned that great size amounts to great
political strength and have thus hypothesized positive coefficients for
employment variables.

However,

employment growth may be a somewhat

dubious indicator of political clout.

The magnitudes of these

coefficients are not expected to be the same,
be positive.

and they are expected to

This expectation is based on increased need and the

electorate's ability to pay rationale, not increased political power for
business.
The single equation to be statistically estimated several times
will be;

G - f(RB, XP, NB. TX, BA. PV. TB, MY, PP. TF. CG)

w here G represents government expenditures.

The dependent variables,

g eneral expenditures and each of the variables representing spending in
the functional categories,

will be substituted for G in turn.

u s e d in the model are as follows:
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DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES IN THE MODEL

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
GENX
EDUC
H IWA
WELF
HOSP
H EAL
POLI
N RPR
OTHR

=
=
—
“
=
=
=
=
=*

general expenditures
education expenditures
highway expenditures
welfare expenditures
hospital expenditures
health expenditures
police expenditures
natural resource and park expenditures
other expenditures

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
PP =s= population
RB = urbanization
M Y = med i a n family income
PV = percent of families below poverty level
TS = "tax price" (tax share)
XP = the ability to export property taxes
TB = taxable property value
TF *■ intergovernmental transfer payments
CG = charges and fees
BA = employment change in "basic" industries
NB = employment change in "nonbasic" industries
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSIONS

This chapter reports the results of the regressions.
are presented.

Three tables

The first summarizes the results of the linear

regressions.

The second table gives the results of the log-linear

regressions.

The final table shows the simple Pearson correlation

coefficients between each pair of the independent variables.

Each cell

of the results tables contains a variable's estimated coefficient,
coefficient's t-statistic,

and its p-value.

the

The p-value gives the

actual level of statistical significance of the coefficient.

It

provides an alternative to use of the classical 0.05 cut-off point for
statistical significance.

The t-statistics are made somewhat

superfluous by the inclusion

of the p-values,

but they are reported

because economists are more familiar with them than with p-values.
Also,

inclusion of the t-statistics allows comparison of this model's

statistical "fit" of the data with that of other studies.
In general,

the statistical goodness of fit of both the linear and

log-linear regression models,
acceptable and,

in fact,

as measured by R^ and the F statistic,

remarkably high in the cases of general

expenditures and spending on education.
always quite high,
spending

(HOSP),

is

The

F statistics are almost

the one exception being the regressions for hospital

indicating that most equations explain far more of the

v a r i a t i o n in the dependent variables than is left unexplained.

58
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LINEAR

Dep.
Var.

GENX

B
t
P

EDUC

B
t
P

HIWA

B
t
P

WELF

B
t
P

HOSP

B
t
P

HEAL

B
t
P

POLI

B
t
P

NRPR

B
t
P

OTHR

B
t
P

BA

PV

29595.42
0.09
0.93

-484.80
-0.59
0.56

-8006.45
-1.21
0.23

-41019.85
-0.20
0.84

427.53
0.88
0.39

2930.29
0.70
0.49

295.44 -126072.30
-0.98
1.01
0.32
0.33

384.45
1.20
0.22

-517.99
-1.95
0.85

131568.80
0.82
0.42

575.93
1.49
0.14

-2866.50
0.87
0.39

-134.16
-0.50
0.62

19385.51
0.16
0.87

-350.63
1.23
0.22

22.23
0.01
0.99

-0.10
-0.07
0.95

-12.60
-0.14
0.89

13901.76
0.35
0.73

-15.98
-0.17
0.87

-341.75
-0.41
0.68

0.89
0.69
0.50

-0.38
-0.26
0.80

219.72
2.45
0.02

2906.61
0.07
0.94

33.54
0.35
0.72

500.94
0.62
0.54

-23.62
-0.04
0.98

-1.07
-0.51
0.61

0.75
0.32
0.75

-210.51
1.46
0.15

72968.67
1.15
0.26

-1.17
-0.01
0.99

-144.30
-0.11
0.91

-2043.86
-1.09
0.28

0.55
0.09
0.93

-10.11
-1.48
0.15

261.00
0.63
0.53

-76548.70
-0.42
0.68

11647.73
2.65
0.01

3466.76
0.93
0.36

CONST

RB

XP

NB

4086.35
1.22
0.23

15.41
1.47
0,15

27.97
2.35
0.02

141.01
0.20
0.85

-2661.22
-1.28
0.20

-2.07
-0.31
0.76

14.60
1.92
0.06

154.45
-0.12
0.91

-193.71
-0.15
0.88

-0.76
-0.18
0.86

9.41
1.95
0.06

1088.38
0.66
0.51

0.43
0.08
0.94

0.45
0.08
0.94

-336.70
-0.92
0.36

-285.02
-0.24
0.81

2.48
0.64
0.53

4.14
0.93
0.36

127.94
0.31
0.76

1.37
1.03
0.31

-377.52
0.94
0.35

TS
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REGRESSION RESULTS

TB

MY

0.11
1. 36
0.18
0.13
2.53
0.01

PP

TF

-0.22
-1.25
0.22

0.13
6.38
0.00

1.06
3.93
0.00

0.12
1.12
0.27

0.11
14.19
0.00

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.90

0.02
0.30
0.76

0.03
5.74
0.00

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.64

0.03
0.67
0.54

-0.05
-0.54
0.59

0.04
6.61
0.00

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.57

-2.75
-0.09
0.93

0.02
0.36
0.72

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

-0.07

0.01
8.81
0.00

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.7.7

0.02
11.55
0.00

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.87

0.03
13.43
0.00

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.85

0.01
2.26
0.03

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.41

-1.55E-03
-0.05
0.96

0.01
1.14
0.26
8.77E-03
0.90
0.37
0.03
1.93
0.06
0.06
1.29
0.21

-8.86E-03
-0.04
0.69
0.02
0.97
0.34
9.70E03
-0.28
0.78
0.09
0.91
0.37

-2.69E-03
0.613
0.54

CG

1.83E-03
9.87
0.00

ADJ RZ

F

0.97

166.89
0.00
51.52
0.00
11.54
0.00
8.95
0.00
0.64
0.76
20.98
0.00
39.50
0.00
35.71
0.00
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LOG-LINEAR

Dep.
Var.

CONST

RB

XP

NB

TS

BA

PV

= = = = « =

GENX

B
t
P

EDUC

B
t
P

HIWA

B
t
P

WELF

B
t
P

HOSP

B
t
P

HEAL

B
t
P

POLI

6
t

0.04
0.77
0.44

0.37
1.67
0.11

0.05
1.49
0.15

0.23
1.81
0.08

-14.57
-2.42
0.02

-0.01
-1.94
0.06

0.20
2.66
0.01

-0.01
-0.13
0.90

0.37
0.99
0.33

-0.01
-0.13
0.90

0.40
1.73
0.09

-4.12
-0.52
0.61

-0.01
1.94
0.06

0.10
1.00
0.33

-0.11
-1.01
0.32

0.37
0.75
0.46

0.14
1.65
0.11

0.03
0.09
0.93

-21.40
-0.95
0.35

-0.01
-0.59
0.56

-0.03
-0.11
0.92

0.32
-1.34
0.19

1.91
1.36
0.18

0.32
1.34
0.19

-0.36
-0.42
0.68

-41.83
-0.15
0.88

-0.51
-2.00
0.05

-4.18
-1.23
0.23

-4.08
-1.08
0.29

23.73
1.37
0.18

6.13
2.09
0.04

6.49
0.62
0.54

-29.00
-1.59
0.12

-2.66E-03
-1.60
0.87

0.39
1.77
0.09

0.08
0.34
0.74

0.81
0.72
0.48

-0.34
-1.77
0.09

0.74
1.07
0.29

0.01
1.17
0.25

0.08
0.65
0.52

0.29
2.20
0.04

0.06
0.10
0.92

-50.37
-2.82
0.01

-0.02
-1.02
0.32

0.25
1.16
0.25

0.08
-0.33
0.75

2.47
2.22
0.03

-0.38
-2.03
0.05

1.73
2.56
0.02

B -171.36
t
-1.81
0.08
P

0.07
0.84
0.41

-1.29
-1.12
0.27

-1.88
-1.46
0.16

19.87
3.38
0.00

-0.91
-0.91
0.37

2.99
0.83
0.41

B
t
P

OTHR

0.10
2.39
0.02

-9.61
-1.01
0.32

P

NRPR

-4.14E-03
-1.37
0.18

-5.85
-1.66
0.11

5.26E- 03 1.36E03
0.00
0.05
0.96
0.99
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REGRESSION RESULTS

TB

MY

PP

TF

CG

ADJ RZ

---------------"

F
-------------

“

0.57
2.42
0.02

0.07
0.18
0.86

0 .80
3.56
0.00

0.20
2.90
0.01

0.29
6 66
0.00

0.98

0.79
2.00
0,06

0. 76
1.09
0.29

1.30
3 .73
0.00

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.92

0.82
I. 57
0.13

-0.36
-0.39
0.70

1.18
2.58
0.02

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.81

1.89
1.27
0.21

0.21
1.08
0.94

2.78
2.13
0.04

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.62

28.94
1.58
0.12

-18.84
-0.58
0.56

23.77
1.49
0.15

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.10

0.84
0.70
0.49

1.78
0.84
0.41

1.86
1.77
0.09

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.70

0.08
0.13
0.90

0.74
0.67
0.51

0.85
1.56
0.13

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.86

2.60
2.21
0.03

2.88
1.39
0.17

3.43
3.33
0.00

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.71

20.09
3.23
0.00

4.14
0.38
0.71

17.77
3.27
0.00

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0.31

140.67
0.00
53.79
0.00
19 .55
0.00
8.10
0.00
1.46
0.21
10.94
0.00
26.86
0.00
11.38
0.00
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MATRIX OF SIMPLE CORRELATIONS
AMONG THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

MY

PV

TS

TB

XP

TF

CG

PP

RB

BA

NB

MY

I. 00

- .79

- .19

- .03

- .02

.51

.60

.55

.71

.40

.41

PV

- .79

1.00

.07

.23

.17

- .37

-.35

- .41

- .46

- .22

- .43

TS

-.19

.07

1.00

- .20

-.15

- .17

- .16

- .16

- .22

.07

- .01

TB

- .03

.23

- .20

1. 00

.72

- .17

- .05

- .29

- .17

- .03

- .13

XP

- .02

.17

- .15

.72

1.00

- .20

- .14

- .31

- .12

.05

.01

TF

.51

- .37

- .17

- .17

- .20

1.00

.70

.84

.57

.23

.36

CG

.60

- .35

- .16

- .05

- .14

.70

1.00

.81

.55

.49

.36

PP

.55

- .41

- .16

- .29

-.31

.84

.82

1.00

.66

.30

.36

RB

.71

- .46

- .22

-.17

- .12

.57

.55

.66

1.00

.23

.18

BA

.40

.22

.07

- .03

.05

.23

.49

.30

.23

1.00

.41

NB

.41

- .43

-.01

- .13

.01

.36

.36

.36

.18

.41

1.00
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values for

show the linear equations for general expenditures and

spending in all functional areas except welfare,

hospitals,

spending compare favorably to single equation models
studies.

and other

in previous

The linear equation for welfare spending yielded an

acceptable,

though hardly outstanding,

and other spending,

though,

R^.

The equations for hospital

are quite disappointing.

Much the same can

be said for the statistical "fit” of the log-linear equations to the
data;

the equations are generally acceptable or better, with the

exception of those for welfare and other spending.
Also,

it is the coefficients of the same independent variables

w hich often are statistically significant in both the linear and log-,
linear forms.

Because the estimates for the coefficients in the log-

linear equations show much the same pattern of statistical significance
as those in the linear equations,
both sets of regressions.

little is to be gained by discussing

The log-linear formulation has one advantage

over the linear form, however;

it has the virtue of producing

coefficients that economists can interpret as elasticities.
reasons,

For these

the discussion will be confined for the most part to the

performance of the variables in the log-linear models.
The results of the

regressions for general expenditures and

spending in all functional areas show that the population variable's
coefficient is the coefficient which is most frequently statistically
significant.

It is also positive,

as was expected.

regressions for hospital expenditures,
significant at the 0.09 level or below.

Except for the

these coefficients are always
They are statistically
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significant at or below the 0.05 level for general expenditures and for
five of the eight functional spending categories.
The urbanization variable,
in these models.

however,

does not perform nearly as well

That its coefficients are statistically significant at

the 0.06 level or below in the log-linear regressions for three
functional areas,
encouraging.

education, highways,

However,

and hospitals,

is somewhat

the regression for hospitals explains so little

of the variation in spending that the statistical significance of the
coefficient means little,

if anything.

highway spending do, however,
spending in these areas,

The equations for education and

explain substantial portions of the

and the statistical significance of the

urbanization coefficients probably has theoretical importance here as
well.

The negative sign on these coefficients indicates that some

consumption or production economies are enjoyed as urbanization
increases.

This should not be too surprising in light of the fact that

M ontana is quite sparsely populated and even urban areas, as defined by
the Census Bureau, are small and sparsely populated by national
standards.
The general statistical insignificance of the "traditional demand
variables," tax price and median income,

in these models was quite

disappointing--especially since the models were cast in the mold of the
p reviously quite successful median voter model.

The coefficient for tax

price did not even once in the log-linear models have the theoretically
correct

(negative)

sign that one would expect of a price variable.

did display a negative sign for three functional areas in the linear
models:

however,

even these coefficients were not statistically
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significant at any acceptable level.)

One must conclude that whatever

role this measure of taxes plays in the determination of public
spending,

it is not as a simple price.

The estimated coefficient for median income was not statistically
significant for any of the regression equations.^®
showing of the "tax price" coefficients,
county government expenditures,

Along with the poor

this is strong evidence that

at least in Montana, are not properly

mode l e d as the quantity variable in a taxpayer's demand function.

That

these demand function variables do so poorly in these models is quite
surprising in light of their statistical importance
of public expenditure analysis.

in previous studies

The cause of their statistical

insignificance may be that the incomes of taxpayers play a relatively
minor role in the financing of county expenditures.

This possibility

seems to be supported by the fact that the coefficients for the

*^It should be noted here that the tax price here is not a simple
variable at all.
In fact, a number of other variables have been
included in the model to capture the marginal cost of public goods.
A
technical problem in the estimation of coefficients for all of these
"price" variables arises from the fact that a number of such variables
exist and several of these variables are highly collinear with one
another.
'‘®Again, multicollinearity may be the cause of the statistical
insignificance of this variable's coefficient.
Romer and Rosenthal have
poin t e d out that collinearity between income variables and wealth-based
variables such as those involving the tax base may be the reason for the
lack of explanatory effect for income in some models.
Collinearity
between median income and "tax share" does not appear to be a problem
here (r = -.185). However, multicollinearity may yet be a problem.
In
this Mont a n a data set, median income is most highly correlated with the
poverty variable (r = -.785) and moderately correlated with transfer
payments (r - .513), charges and fees (r = .596), and population (r =
.550).
Median income's statistical insignificance could well be because
of that variable's correlation with any of these others mentioned or the
c o mpounded effect of all correlations with other explanatory variables.
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propo r t i o n of families below the poverty level were positive in all of
the equations in which they were statistically significant.

The

coefficients for this income distribution variable were positive and
statistically significant for general expenditures at the 0.08 level and
the 0.09 level for education expenditures.

The coefficient for this

variable was positive and statistically significant at an even lower
level for natural resources spending.

If taxpayer incomes were

important for the financing of public goods and services, one would
expect the coefficient for the median voter's income to be positive and
statistically significant in most,

if not all, of the equations,

especially the general expenditures equation.

One would also expect the

coefficients for the income distribution variable to be negative and
significant in many of the equations.

The fact that these expectations

were not borne out indicates that the resident taxpayer may have a much
less powerful role in the determination of public spending than the
m e d i a n v ot er model implies.
Other factors

Important in the finance of local goods and services

do better in this mrdel.

For instance,

the size of the tax base and the

proxy for the ability to export taxes both yield positive and
s tatistically significant coefficients in the general expenditures
model.

Also,

predicted,
areas.

the coefficients for the tax base are positive,

as

and statistically significant in three of the functional

The coefficient for the ability to export taxes is also positive

and significant for one of the functional areas.

These two variables

represent wealth that the taxpayer may tap to finance public goods.

By

vo t i n g for a candidate who will levy more taxes against all property in
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the county,

the decisive voter or block of voters,

economic median or not,
goods to others,

whether at the

can spread the pain of having to pay for public

both inside and outside the jurisdiction.

He or she

can enjoy a high level of consumption of public goods without having to
pay the full cost.

The idea that voters choose to force others to pay

for their own consumption whenever possible should not be surprising to
economists at all

Such "free rider" behavior has long been observed in

the behavior of consumers of private as well as public goods and
services.
The strong positive effect which intergovernmental transfer
payments and charges and fees have on general expenditures in these
models supports such a theory of voter behavior.

Intergovernmental

transfers allow the cost of public goods to be spread among taxpayers
other than those in the jurisdiction receiving the payment.
of those initiating the transfers
by the receiving government,
transfers

The intent

is to induce greater public spending

and this device apparently works.

Whether

induce greater local spending because the voters choose to

take advantage of the opportunity to spread the costs or because
politicians see the opportunity to spend without inflicting too much
financial pain among their constituents is not addressed by statistical
models.

However,

the results of this public expenditure study seem to

be consistent with either interpretation.
The two measures of employment growth used in these models seemed
to have little effect on the amount of public expenditures
pres u m a b l y on the quantity of public goods demanded).

(and

In the few cases

in w h i c h statistically significant relationships were detected,
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appeared to be contradictory.
employment,

The estimated coefficient for basic

for instance, was statistically significant at the 0.05

level or below only twice in the log-linear equations.
expenditures equation,

the coefficient is positive;

coefficient is negative

In the hospital

the basic employment

in the natural resources equation.

The

estimated coefficient for nonbasic employment was positive and
significant

in only one of the functional area equations.

These two variables were included in the model as tests of the
maintained hypothesis that employment growth positively affects county
government expenditures.
hypothesis.

Virtually no support was found for this

If any relationship exists,

it is not one which could be

detected by a linear regression model or a log-linear model.

69
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL

The builder of any econometric model faces a dilemma in the choice
of his or her independent variables.
process

is quite complex,

that process.

Because virtually any economic

several variables may be needed to describe

Thus the econometrician always runs the risk of

m isspecifying his model by omitting important variables from the model.
The other side of the dilemma results from the likelihood that economic
variables,

particularly those relating to the same process, are likely

to be collinear and thus cause technical problems in a multiple
regression model.

A set of single equation models such as this, with 11

independent variables,
multicollinearity.

is quite likely to suffer the ill effects of

Also the correlation matrix previously presented

indicates
that there is substantial collinearity between several pairs of the
variables.

The predictor variables identified in the previous chapter

as statistically significant do,

in fact,

"explain," by themselves,

a

great deal of the variation in the general spending of county
governments

in Montana.

A log-linear regression of general expenditures

on the five most statistically significant independent variables
r e p o r t e d in the previous chapter--charges and fees,
transfers,

population,

the size of the tax base,

intergovernmental

and the proxy for the

70
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ability to export t a x e s --statistically "explains" ninety seven percent
of the variation in the log of general expenditures.
coefficients of two of these variables,
tax base,
model

seem to be quite unstable.

However,

the

population and the size of the

Even though the eleven-variable

"explains" virtually no more of the variation in expenditures,

the

coefficients of these two variables have a value approximately double
that in the five-variable model.

Such instability indicates substantial

multicolli nearity among the explanatory variables and is a sign that
there ma y well be more of them than are needed in the model.

The point

of this comparison is that general expenditures can be statistically
"explained" quite thoroughly with fewer variables than used in the
larger model tested in this study.

Furthermore, none of the

statistically important variables happens to be one of the "traditional
demand function variables," tax price or median income.

THE PROXIES FOR PRICE AND QUANTITY

The fact that the "traditional demand ^unction variables" of tax
price and median income were very rarely statistically significant in
this model may be accounted for in one of at least three w a y s .

Two

explanations are theoretical and remaining is technical.
A possible explanation of the poor showing of tax price in this
model

is that one or more of the many assumptions used to construct the

d emand relationship in the median voter model was unrealistic.
a ssumptions are of three main types.

First,

These

the assumption that

expenditures are a valid proxy for the quantity of public goods and
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services demanded Is doubtful.

For this to be maintained,

one must also

assume that government is a constant cost industry and that costs do not
var y across political jurisdictions.

The constant cost assumption may

be somewhat reasonable within a very narrow range of output, but it
w ould be surprising indeed if unit costs remained unchanged as
government oucput changed greatly.
government,
variations

Structural differences in

party and ideological differences

in politicians,

and

in the prices of private goods from place to place make the

second of these underlying assumptions untenable.
The second type of assumption allows tax share, or "tax price," to
be interpreted in the same way as the price of a private good or service
in

traditional demand analysis.

formulation of this "price."

The flaw in this assumption is the

The "tax price" variable

in this model was

the ratio of the taxable value of the median-valued home in the county
to the taxable value of all taxed property in the county.
formulation to be interpreted as a price faced by voters

For such a
(who "choose"

an expenditure level), non-residents must own no residential property in
the county and residents must own no nonresidential property.

Only in

such circumstances can this measure of tax price be the median voter's
true share of the tax burden.
Recognizing that such a distribution of the tax base is improbable,
previous researchers have still been willing to use this measure as a
proxy for the marginal cost faced by taxpayers.

They have constructed

models whi ch appear quite sound, at least when judged by statistical
criteria.

That the estimated coefficient of "tax price" did not show up

in this study as statistically significant at an acceptable level,
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often had the theoretically Incorrect sign, may be the result of poor
craftsmanship on the part of this researcher in the construction of the
model.

It could also be that previous researchers were simply lucky in

their choice of data sets and/or explanatory variables.
The third type of assumption is that which has the voter perceiving
the tax share as his or her marginal cost for the public goods received.
This assumption is vulnerable whenever expenditures are determined in a
legislative body and not a market.

Public expenditures are most often

determined in some sort of legislature,
House of Representatives,
market;

or Senate.

such as a council,

commission.

They are never determined in a

even when levies are voted on directly,

options and can not bargain for a third.

the voter has only two

Prices in the private market

can be relied upon to give the consumer very definite information about
the marginal cost of a good or service.

Proponents of the median voter

theory maintain that analogous information is offered to the voter in
political campaigns.

It is almost a commonplace,

though, that voters

get v e r y indefinite information from the political candidates with whom
they supposedly place their purchase orders.

Furthermore,

the

legislator's opportunities for strategizing, the fact that not all
citizens use and enjoy all public goods equally (even if they have equal
access),

and the prevalence of general fund financing make the voter's

job of identifying the tax dollars he pays as financing any particular
public goods he receives nearly impossible.
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A PUBLIC FINANCE ALTERNATIVE

The second theoretical explanation for the failure of the median
voter model in this study encompasses the roles of both the "tax p r i c e ”
and median income variables.
model should be
in this study.

It also suggests that the median voter

augmented with a number of variables of the type used
The performance of a number of variables that describe

the method of financing government expenditures in the linear models
tested,
capita

the tax export variable
( T B ) , transfer payments

that voters,

politicians,

( XP), size of the property tax base per
( TF), and charges and fees C G ) , suggests

or both pay as much or more attention to who

pays as to how much is paid for public goods and services.

The ability

to spread the cost of public goods by taxing the property of
nonresidents of the jurisdiction and other residents,

accepting revenues

(someone else's tax dollars) from higher levels of government,

or

collecting fees from the users of particular public goods was embodied
in several of the statistically significant variables in this model.
Together w ith the influence of population they "explained" almost all
the va r i a t i o n in general expenditures and a substantial portion of the
spending in the functional areas.

The strength of these variables may

point to the reason for the weakness of "tax price" and median income.
The variables mentioned above have been justified
voter's demand schedule as supplements to "tax price."

in the median
Their presence

in the model helps to capture that voter's true marginal cost of public
goods.

However,

they may also be interpreted as variables in the supply

schedule of local government.

That there is some overlap of variables

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

in the supply and demand functions of an economic system does not in
itself invalidate the model,
concern.

but it does point to a possible cause for

The demand function of the median voter presented here may not

be adequately identifled--i .e . distinguished from local government's
supply function.
Identification may be viewed as a technical problem in econometrics
w hich is caused by an improper choice of variables
in each equation in the economic system.

included and excluded

Improper identification makes

it impossible for the investigator to tell which function in the system
is being statistically estimated.

In the case of a system "explaining"

the supply and demand of public goods,

a potential misidentification of

the demand function will make it impossible to determine whether the
supply function,

the demand function,

or some combination of the two is

being estimated.
A n equation in an economic system is identified by the variables it
does not contain.
dilemma:

This fact suggests a solution to the identification

review the equation in question to insure that it does not

contain too many important explanatory variables appearing in the other
equations of the system. The solution is formalized as the "order
condition" for identification and can be stated as the requirement that
the num b e r of excluded exogenous variables must be greater than or equal
to the nu m b e r of included endogenous variables less one.^®
solution m a y appear a bit too ad hoc,

Such a

since the supply equation in the

system in question has not been formally specified.

However,

49peter Kennedy. A Guide to E c o n o m e t r i c s . 2nd Ed.
Massachusetts: MIT press) p. 138.

one can

(Cambridge
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p r o b a b l y safely say that the supply equation in a public goods system
w o u l d contain such common supply variables as lagged prices of public
goods,

leftover stocks,

technology indicators.

costs of physical factors of production,

and

This list of probable indicators would appear to

adequately identify the median voter's demand schedule as it is
expressed here.since these variables do not appear in the demand
equation.
M ontana county taxpayers,

in fiscal 1981-82, actually financed

surprisingly little of their respective county's general expenditures.
On average,

among the 54 counties in this study,

the difference between

general expenditures and the sum of intergovernmental transfers and
charges and fees accounted for only sixty four percent of county general
expenditures.

Citizens of three counties --Treasure. Granite,

and

Lincoln--a ctually financed less than half of county general expenditures
w ith their own tax dollars.
Blaine county,

The highest paying citizens,

those of

paid for only eighty six percent of general expenditures

w i t h their tax dollars.

With less than two thirds of county general

expenditures being financed with locally raised tax dollars, and much of
that burden being exported to nonresidents and the rest being spread
a mong m a n y residents,

the share of the median voter might well be

e xpected to have little statistical influence in a regression model.

LIMITATIONS OF THE REGRESSION MODEL

The final possible explanation of the failure of the estimated
coefficients of "tax price" and median income to show up as
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statistically significant is that a regression model,
use d here,

such as the one

can only measure linear relationships between variables

transformed v a r i a b l e s ) .

(or

If either or both "tax price" and median income

were closely related to expenditures in some nonlinear manner,
relationship would not be detected by a regression model.

the

This appears

to be the case for the data used in this study.
Simple plots of median income with general expenditures and
spending in all functional areas show a pattern of expenditures
increasing with increasing income, although this pattern is not nearly
so pronounced for some spending categories as o t h e r s .

If one can

interpret expenditures as a proxy for quantity (which is admittedly
doubtful) , this appears to be the relationship one would observe in a
demand function.
The case for the redemption of the "tax price" variable is not
quite so strong,

but it is also encouraging for those who would like to

t hink the taxpayer has something to say in the spending of his or her
money.

W hen "tax price"

is plotted against the expenditure figures,

most cases are clustered near the origins
few are scattered along the axes.

(see appendix B ) .

However,

a

Only a little imagination is required

to see a line concave to the origin in what could be a diagram of a
demand function.
is greatly,
outlier.

Furthermore,

the clustering of cases near the origin

although not entirely,

relieved by the exclusion of a single

The plots on the following page show this clustering effect

and its partial remedy.

The first plot shows the relationship of

general expenditures and "taxprice"

.e .
(TX) for all 54 cases in the samplt
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The second plot shows that of general expenditures and "taxprice" for 5 3
cases

(54 cases less the o u t l i e r ) .
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PLOTS OF TAXPRICE
WITH GENERAL EXPENDITURE
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

One must conclude that county government spending In Montana,
the period tested, was not significantly affected by changes

in

employment.

they

If the employment variables had been important,

probably would have been statistically "significant"
models tested.

for

in the regression

It is true that there may be some non-linear

relationship between county expenditures and employment c h a n g e s , but no
such relationship could be detected through examination of plots of
these variables.

This study turned up no evidence to support a

statistical relationship.

Employment variables are probably not

appropriate for use in future public expenditure research,

at least for

the foreseeable f u t u r e .
The statistical insignificance of median income in the models
tested indicates that the level of county expenditures

in Montana in

fiscal 1982 was being determined by forces other than the ability of the
local voter to pay for those expenditures.

One is tempted to conclude

that the "tax price" variable was statistically insignificant for much
the same reason.

However,

sound conceptually.

the use of a tax-related variable still seems

It could well be that a better formulated tax

variable would appear statistically significant in a regression model.
Both taxes and incomes have theoretical importance in public
expenditure analysis;

any model of public expenditure determination

w h i c h omits them will be seriously m i s s p e c i f i e d .

Any future public

expenditure model should contain these variables;

the magnitude of the
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roles of these variables In the determination of public expenditures
should be decided through empirical analysis,

and these roles will most

likely be different for data from different times and places.
The formulation of both variables
especially that of "tax price."

in the median voter model,

is questionable.

The problem in

distinguishing the portion of taxes paid by county residents
potential voters)

from those paid by nonresidents

psi'ticularly problematic

in the model tested here.

(who are

(who are not) has been
A measure of the

"price" paid by local voters should include only taxes paid by county
residents,

and the "tax price" variable used here clearly does not make

this distinction.

Further research into the distribution of ownership

of taxed property among residents and nonresidents is necessary for the
formulation of a more accurate "price" variable.

If this distribution

b e t w e e n residents and non residents can be accurately determined,

the

"price" variable can be greatly improved and the ability to export taxes
to nonresidents could also be calculated much more precisely.
Economists who use the median voter model most often assume the
v o t e r at the political median is the voter at the economic median as
well.

The model thus requires the use of median income as an

independent variable.

As discussed earlier,

this assumption is dubious.

M odels w hich operate on median income values should be compared in the
future to those using mean income and income at other fractiles.

The

q u e s t i o n of which to use becomes an empirical, not a theoretical,
question.
While the median voter model has performed well in analyses of
public spending in other times and places,

the model fit the Montana
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data p r e sented here only because it had been greatly modified.

It would

appear that the weaknesses of the median voter model were made apparent
by the inclusion in the model of the other public finance variables
discussed above.

When these variables were included in the analysis,

they made the median income and tax share variables statistically
superfluous.

The median voter model has served as a guide to the

formulation of this
function"

model,

though.

In particular,

the "demand

tenor of the model has led this researcher to focus on the

m arginal cost faced by the decisive voter in his or her acquisition of
public goods,

as well as the portion of the total cost of public goods

and services which the voter can put off onto nonvoters
Ultimately,

(nonresidents).

someone must pay for such goods and the inclusion of a

variable or set of variables which reflect this required payment seems a
significant advance
variables

in the structure of the model.

The marginal cost

identified can also be thought of as public sector finance

variables.

Thus,

a fruitful course for future research in the area of

public expenditure analysis will likely be concentration on these
methods of finance and measurement of these methods.

^°This is demonstrated by a "stepwise" regression process,
beg i n n i n g wit h the most elementary specification of the demand function.
W he n general expenditures is regressed on "tax price" and median income
alone, the coefficients of the two independent variables both have the
t h e o retically correct sign (positive for income, negative for price).
W hile the coefficient for "tax price" is statistically insignificant at
an acceptable level of c o n f i d e n c e ,that for median income is quite
significant (t = 5.254, p = .0000). Introduction of the alternative cost
(and wealth) variables--tax base per capita ( T B ) , the ability to export
taxes ( X P ) , intergovernmental transfers ( TF). and charges and fees (CG)-"washes out" the statistical significance of income.
The latter two
v a riables in particular, seem to do the most to overshadow median income
in the model.
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Intergovernmental transfer payments are among these cost variables.
Such transfers Increased dramatically In almost all parts of the U.S.
the first thirty five years of the post-war era.
decreasing radically for the last eight years,

In

They have been

at least In most places.

The results of this analysis of Montana county expenditures

Indicates

that local voters and/or politicians are quite willing to Increase
public expenditures

If those expenditures will be matched by "outside"

m o n e y from the Federal or State governments.

Unfortunately,

transfer

payment figures were available only In highly aggregated form and,
this study,

for

could only be used for the general expenditures equations.

Research should be done with an eye towards eventually
disaggregating such Intergovernmental transfer figures according to
functional spending categories.

County spending responses should also

v a r y w i t h differing origins of the transfers

(State vs.

federal) and

differing requirements of such transfers for matching monies.
In these areas Is needed as well.

Research

Likewise, a disaggregation of the

figures for charges and user fees by the spending categories for which
they are used would be quite fruitful.
The use of debt finance Is also theoretically Important to public
expenditure determination.

Thus, further research Is needed Into the

use and legal limits on the use of this finance tool by local
governments.
Modification of the median voter model by Including the marginal
cost/public finance variables Identified (or Improvements on them) would
seem to be advised.

Ordinary least squares seems to be an adequate tool

for the testing of such models,

and the variables suggested above.
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they can be developed, will probably provide a superior statistical
" e x p l a n a t i o n ” as well as a more insightful theoretical explanation of
the complex process which determines public spending.
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